Humane Provisions For Aborted Human Remains by Patrick Monaghan
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 29 
Number 4 Volume 29, Autumn 1984, Number 4 Article 5 
September 2017 
Humane Provisions For Aborted Human Remains 
Patrick Monaghan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Patrick Monaghan (1984) "Humane Provisions For Aborted Human Remains," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 
29 : No. 4 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol29/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
HUMANE PROVISIONS
FOR ABORTED HUMAN
REMAINS
PATRICK MONAGHAN*
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,, the
Supreme Court struck down as "void for vagueness"' an Akron ordinance
* Patrick Monaghan received his undergraduate education at Brandeis University and Van-
derbilt University. He studied at the London School of Economics and Political Science and
received his J.D. Degree in 1972 from the University of Idaho College of Law, Moscow,
Idaho. He is General Counsel for the Catholic League For Religious and Civil Rights, a
national civil rights organization.
462 U.S. 416 (1983). In Akron, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that § 1870.16 of the Akron ordinance was void for vague-
ness. Id. at 450. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), the Supreme Court initiated
many questions concerning the legal rights, if any, of the fetus, and the manner in which the
fetus, viable or nonviable, should be treated by the physician. See Doudera, Fetal Rights? It
Depends, 18 TRIAL 38 (1982); Glantz, Is the Fetus a Person? A Lawyer's View, in ABORTION
AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS 107 (1983). Whether a physician performing an abortion must
exercise the same care to preserve the life of a viable but aborted fetus as he would a viable,
but unaborted one, was discussed in Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1320-21 (N.D. Ill.
1978), affd sub nom., Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Leigh v. Olson,
497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351-52 (D.N.D. 1980)(requirement of disposal in a "humane fashion" is
unconstitutional as applied). In Wynn, the court upheld the section of an Illinois statute
which provided that:
No person who performs or induces an abortion after the fetus is viable shall fail to
exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and
health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to pre-
serve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted.
449 F. Supp. at 1320. The court found unpersuasive the plaintiffs' assertion that the section
"requires the physician to sacrifice the woman for the unborn fetus, when the needs of the
two conflict," and interpreted the section as not requiring "that the physician increase the
risk to the woman in order to save the fetus." Id. at 1321.
The Wynn court also refused to find the section "void for vagueness." The standard of
care, the court said, depends on the state of medical technology at the time and varies from
one community to another. Therefore, there is no alternative but to "leave discretion in the
hands of the attending physician." Id.
* 462 U.S. at 450; see Constitutional Law-Abortion-Statutory Interpretation- Void for
Vagueness -Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 161, 170-72 (1979).
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that a person charged with a
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that required "any physician who. . . perform[ed] or induce[d] an abor-
tion upon a pregnant woman. . . [to] insure that the remains of the un-
born child . . . [were] disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner. '3
Arguably, ordinances directed at abortionists 4 may require greater speci-
ficity in describing disposal of the fetus. Those who perform abortions
may view the embryo as a medical specimen, rather than as a human
fetus.
Prior to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit struck down the "humane disposal" provision on the ground of
"vagueness," indicating that an essential basis of the ruling was the
court's objection "to mandat[ing] some sort of 'decent burial' of an em-
bryo at the earliest stages of formation."'5 Such language impliedly aligns
the Sixth Circuit, as well as the Supreme Court, with the decision in Mar-
garet S. v. Edwards,' which implicitly held that humane disposal provi-
sions were unconstitutional because such provisions recognized a value in
the fetus.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, dis-
ingenuously stated in Roe v. Wade7 that "[w]e need not resolve the diffi-
cult question of when life begins."' Ten years later, this was repeated in
Akron. It is the contention of this Article that Roe v. Wade and its "prog-
eny," Akron, are examples of the technique of lying, repeating the lie and
continuing to lie. Martin Buber observed, "The lie is the specific evil
which man has introduced into nature. . . . The lie is our very own inven-
tion, different in kind from every deceit that the animals can produce."'
crime be afforded, through a statute, such notice of criminal conduct that a person of ordi-
nary intelligence would know his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute. See Consti-
tutional Law, supra, at 170-72. Therefore, the statute must provide the accused with fair
warning of his criminal conduct, prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
statute, and protect the accused when his constitutional freedoms are in jeopardy.
3 AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870 (1978).
In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 403, 408-09 (1979) (White, J., dissenting), Justice
White, joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, referred to those
who perform abortions as abortionists.
5 Akron Center For Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1211 (6th
Cir. 1981), modified, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
o 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980). In Margaret S., the plaintiff challenged a Louisiana
statute concerning abortion on several counts, one of which was a requirement that a physi-
cian who performed an abortion must dispose of the fetal remains in accordance with the
"Human Remains section of the Cemetery Title." Id. at 221 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN §
40:1299.35.14 (West Supp. 1979)). The district court objected to the regulation, contending
that it required fetal remains to be treated with the same dignity as the remains of a
human. 488 F. Supp. at 222.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 Id. at 159.
* Rosenblum, Coercion in Liberation's Guise, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 143, 146 (T.
Hilgers & D. Horan eds. 1972) (quoting M. Buber).
HUMANE DISPOSAL
When the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Human Life Bill
made its report" Congressman Henry Hyde, among others, observed:...
that of all the twenty-two expert witnesses
who testified before the Senate Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers
... on the medical and biological questions, none ever claimed that unborn
children are not alive nor that they belonged to any other species than
human, or even that they were part of the mother rather than a distinct
individual human being. . . . Wasn't the significance of the birth of Louise
Brown that her conception was in a test tube?"
Indeed, there is a danger for the very order of society when "the factual
concepts on which legal decisions are based are mandatorily defined in
ways which can support only the results reached, [because] the possibility
of reasoned public criticism is eliminated."'"
The popular press and the secular community at large recognize the
deceit inherent in the abortion decisions. Newsweek magazine displayed a
picture of an' eight week old human embryo on its cover with the caption,
"How Life Begins," and stated in its feature article that, despite the "dif-
ficult question of when life begins,"'" human life begins at fertilization.4
If newborns could remember and speak, they would emerge from the womb
carrying tales as wonderous as Homer's. They would describe the fury of
conception and the sinuous choreography of nerve cells, billions of them
dancing pas de deux to make connections that infuse mere matter with con-
sciousness. They would recount how the amorphous glob of an arm bud
grows into the fine structure of fingers agile enough to play a polonaise.
,0 The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S.158 Before the Subcomm. on the Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 13, 24 (1981).
Physicians, biologists, and other scientists agree that conception marks the beginning
of the life of a human being - of a being that is alive and is a member of the human
species. There is overwhelming agreement on this point in countless medical, biologi-
cal and scientific writings. Extensive quotation from such writings would be unneces-
sarily redundant except for the strenuous efforts by some parties to deny or obscure
this basic fact. . . If the United States government is to give reasonable considera-
tion to the abortion issue it must start from the fact that unborn children are human
beings. . .. No governmental body that approaches the abortion question with hon-
esty can accept [the] semantic gymnastics that obscure the real issue. . . . Any sug-
gestion that some human beings can be "nonpersons" under the law simply echoes
the holding of Dred Scott v. Sandford ... a decision the fourteenth amendment was
intended to reverse.
Id.
" Hyde, The Human Life Bill- Some Issues and Answers, in THE HUMAN LIFE REVISW, at
7, 10 (Spring 1982).
" Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Human Life Federalism Amendment, S. REP. No. 465,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1982) (concerning S.J. Res. 110) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAsm].
,3 Begley & Carey, How Life Begins, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1982, at 38.
" Adler & Carey, But Is It a Person?, N.wswFXK, Jan. 11, 1982, at 44.
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They would tell of cells swarming out the nascent spinal cord to colonize far
reaches of the embryo, helping to form face, head and glands. The explosion
of such complexity and order-a heart that beats, legs that run and a brain
powerful enough to contemplate its own origin-seems like a miracle. It is
as if a single dab of white paint turned into a multicolored splendor of the
Sistine ceiling.'
The government itself has revealed the falsity in suggesting that
there is no need to resolve the difficult question of when life begins. The
embryo is spoken of as a child on posters in liquor stores warning that
alcohol may be hazardous and in appeals from the March of Dimes to
"take care of your baby before he is born." Yet this amorphous blob of
paint that becomes the "multicolored splendor of the Sistine ceiling" is
not a person before the law.
The question of "humane disposal" is controversial because it forces
a confrontation with the act itself. What is it that we are doing and what
is this embryo/blob/tissue or whatever? We cannot in one breath recog-
nize "it" as a blob of paint turning into the "multicolored splendor of the
Sistine ceiling" and in another, toss "it" into a waste disposal. "It" is a
human being-a fact we do not care to admit, particularly when we go to
kill it. The pro-abortion advocates are very frank about this contradic-
tion. While admitting that scientific fact conclusively indicates that life
begins at conception, they contend that this fact has been observed
merely to placate the abhorrence of society for killing.16
In Margaret S. v. Edwards, the attempt to separate "the idea of
abortion from the idea of killing" is carried through under the "socially
impeccable auspices" of the federal judiciary." Concerning the require-
ment of burial or creiaation of aborted fetuses, the court stated that
"[s]uch a question equates the abortion process with the taking of a
human life, because fetal remains are required to undergo the same elab-
orate formalities of burial or cremation which are traditionally reserved
for deceased persons. '"18 The court not only maintained that abortion is
" Begley & Carey, supra note 13, at 38.
16 A New Ethic for Medicine and Society, 113 CAL. MED. 67, 68 (1970).
Since the old ethic has not yet been fully displaced it has been necessary to sepa-
rate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing, which continues to be socially
abhorrent. The result has been a curious avoidance of scientific fact, which everyone
really knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra-
or extra-uterine until death.
The very considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize
abortion as anything but taking a human life would be ludicrous if they were not
often put forth under socially impeccable auspices.
Id. (emphasis added).
17 See Margaret S., 488 F. Supp. at 188-90.
" Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
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not killing, but additionally implied that a funeral-the grieving process
for the living, the recognition of the value of the person and the intrinsic
worth of the human made in the image of God - is nothing but an "elab-
orate formalit[y]."
After denying we knew when life begins, we denied that the fetus is a
person; then we denied "it" is a human being; and then, not only in the
face of God did we deny its humanity but in the face of the findings of
the Ethics Advisory Board; we even deny "it" the "profound respect" to
which "it" is "entitled."'"
The holding of Margaret S. exemplifies this denial by stating that
"[s]ince the fetus is not a person, neither is it a human being."20 Not
content with the foolishness inherent in saying a human fetus is not a
human being, the court reiterates its view by criticizing the humane dis-
posal statute for "impermissibly" raising "the status of a fetus to that of
a human being by using language equating fetal remains with human re-
mains ... ."21
In Akron, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, although more subtly, have also arrived at this level of foolish-
ness. The Akron ordinance was declared unconstitutional because it was
vague in that it left open the interpretation that the ordinance mandated
a "decent burial" for aborted fetuses."2
Observe how the court uses "fetus" as a noun unmodified, in contrast
to "being" as a noun modified by "human." The question to be asked is
what kind of being is the aborted fetus? Admittedly, if it is a species of
animal fetus, then certainly such a fetus cannot be raised to the level of a
human being or lowered thereto. Obviously, however, because these are
humans who are obtaining abortions, their fetuses are human and no stat-
ute does, nor can, raise them to the level of human beings because a
human fetus is, by definition, a human being. "Human" and "fetal" are
not mutually exclusive words. In Margaret S., the court uses "remains" as
a noun modified by "fetal" in contrast with "remains" modified by
"human," as if there were some natural opposition between the two.
What kind of "fetal" is opposed to "human"? Certainly not a "human
fetus" or a "fetal human." If the subject matter for disposal is a human
fetus, then the remains are both fetal and human. The remains cannot be
fetal or human - they are either human or non-human, fetal or non-
fetal. The words "human" and "fetal" are not mutually exclusive.
The verbiage of Margaret S. is comparable to Judge Haynsworth's
'9 Report of the Ethics Advisory Board on HEW Support of Research Involving Human In
Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35033, 35056 (1979).
20 Margaret S., 488 F. Supp. at 222.
21 Id.
" See Akron, 462 U.S. at 451 (citing Akron, 651 F.2d at 1211).
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statement in Floyd v. Anders23 that ". . the Supreme Court declared
the fetus in the womb neither alive nor a person within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 4 If it were true that the unborn were not
alive, the alleged need for abortions under any theory would be obviated.
One might certainly state that each of us has a constitutional right to
lie to himself. The law does not require one convicted personally to admit
that he acted wrongly. Likewise, the fact that a woman contemplating
committing an abortion internally knows that it is the taking of human
life does not mean that she should by law be required to acknowledge
externally the action.
Presumably, a woman presently possesses the right to kill the unborn
child, but not the right to demand that society financially underwrite her
decision or to applaud by pretending "the human embryo" is not "enti-
tled to profound respect" as even the United States Government's own
Report of the Ethics Advisory Board concluded it was.25 Though an indi-
vidual may have a right to lie to himself, he has no right to demand that
the rest of us deny thathe is acting, or that the rest of us act as if nothing
were occurring. Moreover, a provision for humanely disposing of aborted
fetal remains need not bring up the question of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade, since the fetus has been afforded rights in other
areas of the law without reference to Roe.1
6
Indeed, the opposition that the abortionists make to humane disposal
raises a question of our own comfort with the whole materialistic philoso-
phy.2 7 If the embryo is really a blob, a speck of flesh, a hank of hair, and
nothing more, why care about how it is disposed of? The true target of
those opposed to the "humane disposal" concept, however, is not what is
23 440 F. Supp. 535 (D.S.C. 1979).
24 Id. at 539.
16 See 44 Fed. Reg. 35033, 35056; FEDERALISM, supra note 12, at 42 (and polls cited therein).
26 See, e.g., Doudera, supra note 1, at 39-44; Glantz, supra note 1, at 109-16. In the areas of
property law (inheritance), criminal law (for the viable fetus), and tort law, certain rights
have been guaranteed to the fetus. See Glantz, supra note 1, at 109-16. In Wynn v. Scott,
449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd sub. nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1979), the district court protected the rights of the aborted fetus by upholding a provision of
the Illinois Abortion Act prohibiting any "exploitation of or experimentation with the
aborted tissue." Id. at 1322. Finally, "the state interest in the dignity of treatment of human
life, even if it has never been considered by the Court as a justification for an absolute
abortion prohibition, ought to justify a state regulation governing the disposition of human
remains, including fetal remains." L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A COMPEN-
DIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL COURT ABORTION CASES 302 (1980); accord M. SHAW & A.
DOUDERA, DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 263 (1983)
(questions whether aborted fetus is granted same legal protection against "infliction of in-
dignity" as is corpse).
27 See Jancin, Emotional Turmoil of Physicians: Staffeld Biggest D & E Problem, OB. GYN.
NEWS 1, 16 (Dec. 15, 1981).
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done with the human "material," but that the human soul is being at-
tacked. The established orthodoxy demands that we act as though there
were no God and that we have no soul.
While scientists ponder the Shroud of Turin or the heavens for
proof,28 however, the shocking evidence of our spiritual nature bursts
forth in the twentieth century through the testimony of Auschwitz, the
Gulag, Cambodia, and Nagasaki. Once we recognize the evil illustrated by
the events of this century, we know God is and we are-and the stakes of
the conflict. As Elie Wiesel heard intuitively on entering a concentration
camp as a prisoner: " The soul is important and the enemy knows it;
that's why he tries to corrupt it before destroying us. Do not let him. '29
By their public positions against humane disposal, abortionists show
how they internalize the knowledge of killing. In accepting the responsi-
bility of killing, the abortion advocate is driven by a dynamic much like
the slaveholders of old. Slavery was once apologetically defended as a
necessary evil. Its actual evil nature compelled it to advocate itself as a
"positive good."
Similarly, as with slavery, we have watched abortion move from be-
ing a drastic measure, a last resort, a necessary evil, an unfortunate occur-
rence, to a "fundamental right" upon which a vast industry is built. The
term "abortion choice" becomes layered with a nonsensical attitude as
though it is something that everyone should have along with the chicken
in every pot and the car in every garage.
It has become increasingly evident that an emerging consensus is now
recognizing this abominable act for what it truly is: the systematic killing
of defenseless human beings. Recently, in Corpus Christi, Texas, two le-
gally aborted fetuses discovered in a garbage dump were released by au-
thorities for burial. Just as a nation honors her dead abroad and seeks
them out though they be in a Southeast Asian jungle, or victims of terror-
ism in San Francisco or South America, so do the bodies and souls of the
aborted unborn require a fitting and proper burial.
If we are a deeply "religious people," as stated by Justice Douglas,30
and "a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life," according to
Justice Brennan,3' surely individuals should at least be able to have a
memorial service without first necessitating the removal or consideration
of a preliminary injunction, and a legislative provision for the remains of
the aborted should be enacted.
The Japanese experience, including the emphasis on grieving for the
aborted fetus, suggests the growing recognition of the horror of the act of
" See R. JASTROw, GOD AND THE ASTRONOMERS (1978).
"E. WEismEL, ONE GENERATION AFTER 79-80 (1970).
" See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
83 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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abortion and the actual humanity of the fetus. At the same time, the
large number of Japanese abortions has given rise to temples like Hase, in
Kamakura, an ancient capital of Japan, where more than 50,000 statues
stand, honored as repositories for the souls of the unborn babies. A Bud-
dhist altar in Hase is decorated with children's clothes and toys, and
holds dozens of written memorials to the children.2
On May 5, 1982, President Reagan gave recognition to 16,433 dead,
kept in containers and labeled in jars, that were found in Los Angeles
when a storage container broke open."' In a letter written to a Dr. Philip
B. Dreisbach upon the discovery of the bodies, the President spoke of the
"great horror and sadness evoked" and of how:
[TIhe reality of abortion and its consequences removes all trace of doubt
and hesitation. The terrible irony about this sudden discovery is not that so
many human lives were legally aborted, but that they are only a tiny pro-
portion of the 1.5 million unborn children quietly destroyed in our nation
each year. This is the truth many would rather not face."
Referring to abortion as evil and a national tragedy, the President, like
many others, was "hopeful that evidence like that found in California will
move those who have thus far preferred silence or inaction and encourage
them to agree that something must be done," and he found it fitting and
proper that a "memorial service for these children" be held. 6
Yet, even in the face of this plea, a judge on June 29, 1982 issued a
preliminary injunction restraining a Los Angeles district attorney from
releasing "fetal tissue" for burial."6 The injunction was granted at the re-
quest of American Civil Liberties Union attorneys, who claimed that
plaintiffs "[would] suffer severe and irreparable injury.31 7 Absurd idioms
abounded. The ACLU would accept "incineration," not "cremation"; the
court would permit for "underground storage," not "burial." Other gov-
ernment-sponsored mass- funerals, induced by law in the twentieth cen-
tury, have included incineration (Auschwitz), as well as "underground
storage" (Babi Yar).
Then, as now, there will be public prayer, and in time, public recog-
nition of the reality of what was done. Today, however, the unconstitu-
32 See Lehner, Japanese Ceremonies Show Private Doubts Over Use of Abortion: Rituals
Help Atone For Guilt, But Mixed Feelings Lead To Rising Public Debate, Wall St. J., Jan.
6, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
"8 Letter from President Reagan to Dr. Phillip B. Dreisbach (May 5, 1982)
" Id.
" Id.
" Feminist Women's Health Center v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr.
918 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1752 (1985).
37 Feminist's Women's Health, Inc., Duncan, Donovan, Atheist's United v. Van de Camp,
No. 413606 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., June 29, 1982).
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tional effort of courts to prohibit by prior restraint religious speech about
those killed by abortion is equally ominous.18
In California, the state court in Feminist Women's Health Center,
Duncan Donovan, Atheists United v. John Van de Camp s actually cited
Margaret S. v. Edwards for the proposition that prayer over aborted
human remains is unconstitutional. Yet, the First Amendment rights of
free speech and free expression of religion clearly include the right for
any individual or group to conduct public prayer. Thus, it is absurd to
rule that because a mother has made a decision to abort her child and
medical personnel have carried out that decision, no one else may pub-
licly pray or express concern in memorial services or otherwise for the
aborted human "material." Such speech in no way entails any govern-
ment expenditure of funds, nor is it "government advancing religion." In-
deed, applying the criteria of Sherbert v. Verner,'" the governmental ac-
tion attempting to prohibit prayer over aborted human remains is in
violation of the First Amendment because it places a substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion, and the government has no overriding
interest secured by the imposition of such a burden. The question must
be asked: what is the religion of the plaintiffs, who, not being content to
express their own views by killing the unborn human life, now demand
that everyone else acquiesce? Certainly, if there should be room for the
practice of their religion, there should be room for others. The abortion-
ists have practiced theirs by a ritualistic killing; now let others practice
their faith by public prayer.
In true obedience, Antigone bowed not to Creon's tyrannical "rule of
law" but buried her brother. How long will we all continue to cower to the
tyranny of Roe v. Wade "rule of law"? 41 For now, the acts of the judicial
officials and the concern of the President remain on record and there can
be no doubt of the emerging consensus. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent,
has rightly prophesized that Roe v. Wade ". . . is clearly on a collision
" W. BRENNAN, THE ABORTION HOLOCAUSI. TODAY'S FINAL SOLUTION 145-65 (1983).
8 Van de Camp, No. 413606 (Cal. App. Dep't Super Ct., June 29, 1982).
40 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Supreme Court annunciated a two-pronged test.
First, the court must determine whether a real burden is placed on the free exercise of
religion. Second, the court must determine whether the government has a compelling inter-
est to establish the burden and whether the interest is achieved by the least restrictive
means. Id. at 403.
"1 See J SwIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS, reprinted in M. McNAMARA, RAGBAG OF LEGAL QUOTA-
TION 227 (1960). "It is a maxim among lawyers that whatever hath been done before may
legally be done again; and therefore, they take special care to record all the decisions for-
merly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind." Id. Contra Acts
4:20 (New Amer. Translation)(Peter and John before the Sanhedrin) "Judge for yourselves
whether it is right in God's sight for us to obey you rather than God"; Acts 5:30 (New Amer.
Translation) (Peter and the Apostles before the Sanhedrin) "Better for us to obey God than
men!" Id.
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course with itself."' 2 The abortionists perceive this "collision course" and
the emerging consensus and state that "why we see that kind of crowd"
for the pro-life cause is in part because:
• . . advancing technology that is being reported in the public media with
the capacity to improve and increase fetal viability, with the capacity to do
a whole range of medical, technical programming in which we begin to see
the fetus as a patient . . . tends to personalize it . . . . [T]echnology and
medical sciences and perceptions of fetal viability are radically changing in
our society . . . if we don't begin to cope with that we are going to find
ourselves isolated some place.
4
8
Having acted without fear of ultimate isolation, these men of our
time now worry about their growing isolation in public life. This further
shows that people, as human beings, can and will recognize the intrinsic
worth of the human as has the President. Ironically, the frenzied and
furied drive of abortionists to deny public recognition of what the act of
abortion is and its consequences is pressed under a rationalization of
"privacy." There is an unintended logic in this position, for as William
Faulkner observed in Intruder in the Dust:
. . . of all human pursuits murder has the most deadly need of privacy;...
man will go to almost any lengths to preserve the solitude in which he evac-
uates or makes love but he will go to any length for that in which he takes
life, even to homicide, .. by no act can he more completely and irrevoca-
bly destroy it . . ..
Our slain brothers and sisters are intruders in the dust. Their lifeless
remains are eloquent appeals to the reason known only to the heart. In
life, they were not recognized as persons; yet, in death, their remains cry
out for an acknowledgement of their personhood that has been abused
and profaned.
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48 National Right to Life News, May 26, 1983, at 12 (quoting A. Moran's speech at the
Abortion Federations Annual Meeting in Minneapolis, Minn.)
" W. FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DusT 57 (1948).
